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Off the Board: NCAA v. Christie
Challenges Congress to "Move the Line" on




NCAA v. Christie, a recent landmark sports-betting case, is making
its way through the federal courts and reigniting the fight for sports-
betting opportunities in the United States. The Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act (PASPA) is at the center of the dispute in that case.
PASPA currently allows only four U.S. states to conduct sports-betting
schemes in their casinos. Even if PASPA is held to be constitutional
after NCAA v. Christie plays out in the courts, Congress should modify
PASPA to allow states to regulate their own sports-betting enterprises.
Without modification, billions of dollars in tax revenues and income
from legitimate sports-betting industries that could go to the United
States instead will continue to go to offshore Internet operations, back-
room book makers, and organized crime. Sports bettors in the United
States who do not live in or frequent one of the four states that sanction
sports betting instead turn to offshore and illegal outfits to place their
bets. Courts have struggled to develop an effective solution of obtaining
jurisdiction over foreign entities that license gambling websites.
However, with minimal enforcement power to regulate foreign and
illegal betting outfits, it is time now to modify PASPA to grant every
U.S. state an opportunity to use revenue-generating sports betting to
relieve debt from their current fiscal budgets. Instead of outlawing 46
states from conducting their own sports-betting schemes, Congress
should modify PASPA to allow each state to decide for itself whether it
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wants to sanction a sports-betting scheme within its jurisdiction. By
allowing each state to experiment as a laboratory with a sports-betting
scheme-tailored to each state's specific needs-a national solution will
emerge, which in time can be implemented into more appropriate and
effective federal regulation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress should modify the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act1 (PASPA) to allow each state to decide whether to
sanction sports betting in its jurisdiction. Each state would act as a
laboratory for sports betting, and a national solution can emerge, which
in time can be implemented into more appropriate and effective federal
regulation. Discourse on the legitimacy of PASPA is not new, 2 but a
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3704 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Anthony G. Galasso, Jr., Note, Betting Against the House (and Senate):
The Case for Legal, State-Sponsored Sports Wagering in a Post-PASPA World, 99 Ky.
L.J. 163 (2010); Eric Meer, Note, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
(PASPA): A Bad Bet For the States, 2 UNLV GAMING L.J. 281 (2011); Erica N. Reib,
Comment, Ante Up or Fold: What Should Be Done About Gambling in College Sports?,
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recent landmark sports-betting case filed by the National Collegiate
Athletic Association (NCAA) and the four major sports leagues (Major
League Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA), the
National Football League (NFL), and the National Hockey League
(NHL)) 3-and backed by the Department of Justice-is making its way
through the federal courts and is reigniting the fight for sports-betting
opportunities in the United States. The lawsuit, seeking to prevent New
Jersey from bringing Las Vegas-style sports betting to its Atlantic City
casinos by enjoining New Jersey from implementing its Sports Wagering
Law,4 alleges that the New Jersey law violates PASPA.5
However, the problems with PASPA go beyond those being
addressed in this "'fight for the future of American sports gambling
' ' 6
playing out in NCAA v. Christie.7  PASPA has lost its relevancy in
today's age of Internet gambling. The policies 8 favored by Congress
21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 621 (2011); Chil Woo, Note, All Bets Are Off: Revisiting the
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
569 (2013); Michael C. Macchiarola, Rethinking Sports Wagering, 85 IND. L.J.
SUPPLEMENT 1 (2010), http://bit.ly/HVmYn5.
3. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, NCAA v. Christie, 926 F.
Supp. 2d 55 1(D.N.J. 2013) (No. 12-4947(MAS)(LHG)) [hereinafter Christie Complaint],
available at http://bit.ly/I amwDOa.
4. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A-1 to -6 (West 2012).
5. See Christie Complaint, supra note 3, at 2.
6. Kevin Braig, NCAA v. Christie: Administrative Law Point May Determine
Future of Sports Betting, DINSMORE & SHOHL LLP (Feb. 20, 2013),
http://bit.ly/1 amwJVX.
7. The NCAA and the other leagues allege that "[g]ambling on amateur and
professional sports threatens the integrity of' sports and is "fundamentally at odds" with
the principles of integrity associated with sports, and that the proliferation of sports
gambling "threatens to harm the reputation" of the leagues and could "adversely affect
the way the public views amateur and professional sports." See Christie Complaint,
supra note 3, at 3. New Jersey counters that the NCAA and the professional leagues lack
standing to enforce PASPA and that PASPA is unconstitutional because it treats states
unfairly and "commandeer[s]" a state's right by requiring local officials to ban sports
gambling. Verified Answer & Affirmative Defenses of Defendant-Intervenor New
Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen's Ass'n, Inc. at 14, NCAA v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d
551 (No. 12-4947(MAS)(LHG)).
8. The policies favored by Congress when it enacted PASPA in 1992 that are part
of the legislative record includes:
The spread of legalized sports gambling would change forever-and for the
worse-what [professional and amateur sports] games stand for and the way
they are perceived.
Sports gambling threatens the integrity of, and public confidence in, amateur
and professional sports. Widespread legalization of sports gambling would
inevitably promote suspicion about controversial plays and lead fans to think
"the fix was in" whenever their team failed to beat the point-spread.
Teenage gambling-related problems are increasing. Of the approximately 8
million compulsive gamblers in America, 1 million of them are under 20.
2013]
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when it enacted PASPA in 1992 require Congress to update the statute
and accept that it is ineffective.
Americans illegally wager between $80 billion and $380 billion per
year on sports.9 Foreign and illegal outfits are thriving in this market at
the expense of the United States because of outdated and ineffective
laws. 10 In 1992, Congress enacted PASPA 11 to curtail the growth of
teenage gambling and to protect the integrity of our national pastimes by
suppressing the development of sports gambling.1 2 However, with the
rise of sports-betting websites and illegal sports-betting schemes, PASPA
has failed to achieve its goals of suppressing the development of sports
gambling and, worse, has denied needed revenues for states. Congress
should modify PASPA to allow each state to determine for itself whether
its citizens find sports betting repugnant or whether they want to allow
this type of gambling in their backyards. 13 With states having unique
Governments should not be in the business of encouraging people, especially
young people, to gamble.
Sports gambling is a national problem. The harms it inflicts are felt beyond the
borders of those States that sanction it. The moral erosion it produces cannot
be limited geographically. Once a State legalizes sports gambling, it will be
extremely difficult for other States to resist the lure. The current pressures in
such places as New Jersey ... to institute casino-style sports gambling illustrate
the point. Without Federal legislation, sports gambling is likely to spread on a
piecemeal basis and ultimately develop irreversible momentum .... "[T]he
interstate ramifications of sports betting are a compelling reason for federal
legislation."
Although the committee firmly believes that all such sports gambling is
harmful, it has no wish to apply this new prohibition retroactively to [States]
which instituted sports lotteries prior to the introduction of our legislation.
S. REP. No. 102-248, at 5-8 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3555-59.
9. NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 2-14 (1999)
[hereinafter GAMBLING REPORT], available at http://bit.ly/9EZybg. Although the
statistics cited from this report are from 1999, there are several other statistics throughout
this Article that will show that illegal sports betting is still a robust enterprise in the
United States.
10. For example, in 2010, foreign online gambling revenues totaled approximately
$30 billion. DAVID 0. STEWART, ONLINE GAMBLING FIVE YEARS AFTER UIGEA 4
(2011), available at http://bit.ly/19zZvOW.
11. See Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 102-559, 106
Stat. 4227 (1992).
12. Bill Bradley & Serene Murphy, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection
Act-Policy Concerns Behind Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 5-6 (1992).
13. This modification could take the form of a moratorium on PASPA, similar to the
House of Representatives bill H.R. 3797 introduced by Rep. Frank LoBiondo in January
2012 to permit a four-year period for States to enact statutes that allow for sports betting;
these statutes would be exempt from PASPA following the four-year moratorium.
[Vol. 118:2
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needs, they can act as laboratories for experimentation. 14 As a result, a
national approach to regulating sports betting can emerge. 15 Allowing
states to act as laboratories for experiment is a progressive, small-scale,
low-risk undertaking, 16 and is a solution that could best help states
capture billions of dollars from sports betting currently being sent to
offshore and illegal outfits.17
Although so much money is wagered illegally each year on sports
betting, Americans legally wagered only $2.3 billion a year on sports
betting in Nevada in 1998.18 This difference shows how Americans want
to wager on sports betting, but are limited in how they may do so legally.
In 2006, Congress recognized this rise in illegal sports betting and
enacted the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA).' 9
Congress wanted to curtail the rise of sports-betting websites by
preventing banks and other financial institutions from transmitting funds
from the United States to Internet casinos and to make lotteries based on
sports events illegal. 20 However, UIGEA has been ineffective in slowing
the rise of Internet sports betting because of the way sports-betting
21websites can operate.
14. See Maeva Marcus, Louis D. Brandeis and the Laboratories of Democracy, in
FEDERALISM AND THE JUDICIAL MIND: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND
POLITICS 75, 77-78, 86-87 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1992).
15. If Congress wants to continue to have a national approach to regulating sports
betting, it can see how states have successfully adopted new gambling laws, what has
been the best and most effective approach to regulating legal sports betting, and adopt
that scheme. The national approach that emerges could either be for the United States to
adopt a sports-betting scheme akin to one of the statutes enacted by a state after the states
have had a chance to experiment; or, the national approach could be to repeal PASPA
altogether and leave sports gambling regulation to the several states.
16. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 78, 87.
17. Although Americans are wagering somewhere between $80 billion and $380
billion a year illegally on sports betting, only a modest amount of money is being
wagered legally. See GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 9, at 2-14.
18. Id.
19. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367 (2006).
20. Id
21. A PricewaterhouseCoopers study found that UIGEA is a failure because millions
of Americans continue to gamble online every single day, and there has been an increase
in online gaming participation by Americans despite UIGEA. Representative Jim
McDermott Labels UIGEA a Failure and Calls for Regulation, POKERRooMREVIEW (Jan.
31, 2008), http://bit.ly/l dP2Ptr; see also Hillary LaClair, $52 Billion Lost to the UIGEA,
SPORTSINTENSITY (Feb. 25, 2006), http://bit.ly/lgYQsiS. In fact, Jeffrey Sandman,
spokesman for the Safe and Secure Internet Gambling Initiative says: "The current ban
on Internet gambling has proved to be a failure as millions of Americans continue to
gamble online each day." Prohibition on Internet Gambling a Failure: US. Federal
Reserve, Treasury Department and Financial Service Companies Call Proposed Rules
Unworkable, SAFE & SECURE INTERNET GAMBLING INITIATIVE, (Feb. 26, 2009),
http://bit.ly/IaBXCo6.
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Internet sports betting is international and no domestic law can
regulate this global enterprise. Internet sports-betting enterprises can
conduct their business and locate their servers outside of the United
States and have their websites accessible from anywhere in the world
without having a physical presence established in any one place.22 The
international community has struggled to obtain jurisdiction over these
Internet sports-betting houses.23 Without effective regulation over these
foreign entities, sports-betting enterprises will continue to prosper by
deriving revenues from sports betting that could be going to our
domestically housed casinos-like those in Atlantic City, New Jersey-
which, in turn, could generate benefit for the states in tax revenue and
income. Instead, PASPA and UIGEA indirectly steer billions of dollars
24to illegal and foreign sports-betting enterprises.
Therefore, Congress should modify PASPA to allow states to
regulate their own sports-betting enterprises. Without modification,
billions of dollars in tax revenues and income from legitimate sports-
betting industries that could go to the United States instead will continue
to go to offshore Internet operations, back-room book makers, and
organized crime.25 Most sports bettors in the United States, who do not
live in, or frequent, one of the four states that sanction sports betting in
compliance with PASPA, 6 instead turn to offshore and illegal outfits to
22. See Kevin A. Meehan, Note, The Continuing Conundrum of International
Internet Jurisdiction, 31 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 345, 346 (2008); see also Ronald J.
Mann, Emerging Frameworks for Policing Internet Intermediaries, J. INTERNET L., Dec.
2006, at 1. For example, the sports-betting website BetPhoenix is licensed by Costa Rica
and has a server located in the United Kingdom, but does not have a physical presence
established in any one place. See BetPhoenix.com, URLMETRICS, http://bit.ly/183NJSC
(last updated Nov. 13, 2013); FAQs, BETPHOENIX, http://bit.ly/183NtTA (last visited
Nov. 18, 2013). Similarly, BetUS Sportsbook is licensed in Central America and the
Netherlands Antilles and has a server located in Panama, but does not have a physical
presence established in any one place. See BetUSCasino.com, URLMETRICS,
http://bit.ly/lfPjEFy (last updated Nov. 13, 2013); FAQs, BETUS, http://bit.ly/IdADpp
(last visited Nov. 18, 2013).
23. See Tim Gerlach, Note, Using Internet Content Filters to Create E-Borders to
Aid International Choice of Law and Jurisdiction, 26 WHITTIER L. REv. 899, 907-12
(2005); see also Meehan, supra note 22, at 348-49.
24. See, e.g., Gary Payne, Sports Betting Already Happens; Government Might As
Well Regulate It, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (June 15, 2012), http://bit.ly/HZLBiM;
Gillian Spear, Think Sports Gambling Isn't Big Money? Wanna Bet?, NBCNEwS.COM
(July 15, 2013, 4:16 AM), http://nbcnews.to/lbCyrCC.
25. See generally GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 9.
26. In considering PASPA, the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that "[allthough
the committee firmly believes that all such sports gambling is harmful, it has no wish to
apply this new prohibition retroactively . . . or to prohibit lawful sports gambling
schemes... that were in operation when the legislation was introduced." S. Rep. No.
102-248, at 8, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3553, 3559. Accordingly, PASPA
provided the following exceptions:
(a) Section 3702 shall not apply to-
[Vol. 118:2
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place their bets.27 Courts have struggled to develop an effective solution
of obtaining jurisdiction over foreign entities that license gambling
websites. 28 With minimal enforcement power to regulate foreign and
illegal betting outfits, it is time now to modify PASPA to allow every
U.S. state an opportunity to use revenue-generating sports betting to
relieve debt from their current fiscal budgets.
Part II of this Article summarizes the current state of sports betting
in the United States, including the impact that sports-betting websites
have had on the industry, and describes the difficulties of regulating
sports-betting websites. Part III reviews the laws that prevent legalized
sports betting in the United States, including some past and present
(1) a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme
in operation in a State or other governmental entity, to the extent that
the scheme was conducted by that State or other governmental entity
at any time during the period beginning January 1, 1976, and ending
August 31, 1990;
(2) a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme
in operation in a State or other governmental entity where both-
(A) such scheme was authorized by a statute as in effect on October
2, 1991; and
(B) a scheme described in section 3702 . . . actually was
conducted.., at any time during the period beginning
September 1, 1989, and ending October 2, 1991, pursuant to the
law of that State or other governmental entity;
(3) a betting, gambling, or wagering scheme.., conducted exclusively in
casinos located in a municipality, but only to the extent that-
(A) such scheme or a similar scheme was authorized, not later than
one year after the effective date of this chapter, to be operated in
that municipality; and
(B) any commercial casino gaming scheme was in operation in such
municipality throughout the 10-year period ending on such
effective date pursuant to a comprehensive system of State
regulation....
28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2006).
Section 3704 "grandfathered in" those lawful sports gambling schemes in operation
when PASPA was enacted. PASPA's "grandfather clause" resulted in exceptions for
four states: Delaware, Oregon, Montana and Nevada. Additionally, New Jersey was the
only other state qualified to establish sports gambling within the one-year period outlined
in Section 3704(a)(3). However, New Jersey chose not to exercise that opportunity
within the allotted window.
27. And, even those gamblers who live in Delaware, Montana, and Oregon likely
have to place illegal sports bets because, although these are three of the four states that
allow some sports betting under PASPA, these states only offer parlay bets and not
single-game bets.
28. See Interactive Media Entm't & Gaming Ass'n, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 580 F.3d
113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Stevo Design, Inc. v. SBR Marketing Ltd., No.
2:11-CV-00304-LRH-CWH, 2013 WL 4648581, at *2-3 (D. Nev. Aug. 29, 2013); 3M
Co. v. Christian Invs. LLC, No. 1:11cv0627 (TSE/JFA), 2012 WL 5531343, at *4-5
(E.D. Va. Aug. 2, 2012); United States v. Lombardo, 639 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1289-90 (D.
Utah 2007); United States v. BETONSPORTS PLC, No. 4:06CV01064 CEJ, 2006 WL
3257797, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 9, 2006).
2013]
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challenges to PASPA and the earlier Delaware and New Jersey
challenges to PASPA, which paved the way for NCAA v. Christie. Part
IV briefly discusses NCAA v. Christie, what issues are at the forefront of
the arguments in that case, and what is at stake for the future of
American sports gambling. Part V explains why, regardless of the
outcome in NCAA v. Christie, individual states should be able to
experiment with sports betting, primarily so revenue and income can
remain in the United States instead of being sent to overseas and illegal
sports-betting enterprises; this Part concludes by summarizing the
benefits of regulating and taxing sports betting.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF SPORTS BETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
PASPA currently prevents 46 U.S. states from conducting sports-
betting schemes. 29 Of the four states that do allow sports betting, Nevada
is the only one without restrictions. 30 With limited access to traditional
sports-betting schemes in U.S. casinos, sports bettors are turning to
sports-betting websites sponsored by offshore companies to make their
bets. Despite efforts by federal and state governments to limit Internet
gambling, the industry has continued to thrive as one of the most
successful Internet industries. 31 A substantial reason for the success of
Internet gambling is that the international community has made little
progress in its efforts in developing a uniform standard of Internet
32jurisdiction. As a result, domestic laws have little to no effect on
sports-betting websites licensed by offshore entities.33
A. Sports Betting Is a Robust Enterprise in the United States
Sports betting could be an enormous source of revenue for states if
they were allowed to regulate their own sports-betting schemes.
Traditional casinos and state lotteries that include sports-betting services
generate nearly $85 billion in annual revenues.34 Nevada has the largest
29. See Michael P. Fecteau, Allfor Integrity or Allfor Naught: The Battle Over State
Sponsored Sports Betting, 7 GAMING L. REv. 43, 45 (2003).
30. Id.
31. See generally Keith Furlong, Gaming Continues as an Internet Success Story,
Despite Obstructions from the U.S. Government: The Industry Uses Self-Regulation To
Fill the Void Left by Governmental Inaction, 9 GAMING L. REV. 211 (2005) (describing
how gambling on the Internet has become such a successful industry).
32. See Meehan, supra note 22, at 348-49; see also Eric J. Carlson, Note, Drawing
Dead: Recognizing Problems with Congress' Attempt to Regulate the Online Gambling
Industry and the Negative Repercussions to International Trade, 32 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 135 (2008).
33. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 32, at 154-55.
34. Andrea L. Marconi et al., Facilitating Financial Transactions in the Age of
Internet Gambling: Compliance with the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act,
[Vol. 118:2
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sports-betting enterprise in the United States with over $3.45 billion
wagered in its sportsbooks alone in 2012, which netted these sportsbooks
a total of $170 million in gross revenue.35 With somewhere between $80
billion to $380 billion wagered illegally on sports every year,36 it is
evident that regardless of the laws, sports bettors will find a way to place
their bets. With PASPA allowing only four states some type of sports
betting within their borders, gamblers are forced to find different avenues
to place their bets.
B. Gamblers Use the Internet to Place Their Sports Bets
Illegal sports gambling in the United States has increased
significantly since the advent of the Internet and the possibilities of e-
commerce opportunities have made offshore sportsbooks and gambling
websites accessible to bettors worldwide, including the in United States,
where sports betting is largely illegal. The number of countries that have
legalized some form of Internet gambling shows how vast this industry
really is. There are approximately 85 countries that offer legal but
regulated sports betting.37 In 2006, 500 companies operated over 2,300
gambling websites worldwide, and over 80 countries have legalized
Internet gambling.38 In 2005, Internet sports gambling saw $4.29 billion
in revenues. 39 Compare that to the $1.7 billion in online sports-betting
revenues in 2001.40 Some of these sports-betting websites include
BetPhoenix, BetUS.Sportsbook, the Greek Sports Book, Sports.com, and
Bookmaker SportsBook.4' With the increased regulation of sports
betting in the United States, most sports bettors are turning to offshore
126 Banking L.J. 602, 602-03 (2009) (citing Frank Vandall, Why We Are Outraged. An
Economic Analysis of Internet Gambling, 7 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 291, 291 (2008);
Maria Starr, Internet Gambling Revenues Up 28 Percent, GAMBLING BEAT (Mar. 1,
2006)), http://bit.ly/17GXex); Starr, supra.
35. Sports Wagering, AM. GAMING ASs'N, http://bit.ly/y92TSj (last visited Oct. 23,
2013) [hereinafter Gaming Facts].
36. GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 9, at 2-14.
37. STEWART, supra note 10, at 4.
38. Michael McCarthy & Jon Schwartz, New Legislation May Pull the Plug on
Online Gambling, USA TODAY (Oct. 3, 2006, 3:29 AM), http://usat.ly/Id4VIE; see also
Jason K. Gross, Internet Gambling & the Law-Prohibition vs. Regulation,
METROPOLITAN CORP. CouNs., Aug. 2006, at 11, available at http://bit.ly/19AmDwj
(citing approximately 2,100 sites and 300 companies outside the United States).
39. Gaming Facts, supra note 35.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Online Sportsbooks & Racebooks, ONLINE CASINO CITY,
http://bit.ly/ljhe0w7 (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). Many of these sports-betting websites
are licensed by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands Antilles, Kahnawake, and Antigua
and Barbuda. See JAMIE WIEBE ET AL., AN OVERVIEW OF INTERNET GAMBLING
REGULATIONS 16 (2008), available at http://bit.ly/l aNr2w4; Gambling Jurisdictions for
Online Operators, GAMBLING SITES (last visited Nov. 18, 2013), http://bit.ly/17hlVr6.
2013]
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sports-betting websites or to illegal gambling outfits to place their bets.
FBI estimates of the amount illegally wagered bets on March Madness
provide evidence of this trend;42 "[t]he FBI estimates that more than $2.5
billion is illegally wagered annually on March Madness each year.
43
Additionally, more bets are placed on the Super Bowl than on any other
single game;44 approximately $98.9 million was wagered legally on the
Super Bowl in 2013 in Las Vegas casinos alone.4 5 Gambling websites
continue to reap a large portion of these profits from Americans, with an
estimated 80 percent of Internet gambling profits coming from the
United States alone.46 Regulating these websites has proven problematic
because of the obstacles associated with obtaining jurisdiction over them.
Without a uniform standard for obtaining jurisdiction over these
websites, it will be difficult to enforce judgments against them if they
violate domestic law.47
42. March Madness is the NCAA Division I basketball post-season tournament to
determine the national championship team; it is a once-a-year event in which 68 college
basketball teams participate.
43. Gaming Facts, supra note 35.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Daniel Schorn, I-Gaming: Illegal And Thriving, CBS NEWS (Nov. 20, 2005),
http://bit.ly/IlBvOZ; see also Bill Britt, Barred in US; Set to Blossom in UK,
MARKETING, Oct. 11, 2006, at 21, available at http://bit.ly/llz3rg ("The world's leading
online gambling companies may be based in the UK and Gibraltar, but until now, the
bulk of their revenues have come from the US."); Gross, supra note 38, at 11 ("Despite
the international locales of Internet gaming firms, they derive most of their income from
Americans.").
47. See Joel Weinberg, Comment, Everyone's a Winner: Regulating, Not
Prohibiting, Internet Gambling, 35 Sw. U. L. REV. 293, 307 (2006). Weinberg notes:
Since all Internet gambling websites have located themselves outside the
United States, any judgment would go unenforced, unless the nation in which
the Internet gambling operator was located gave full faith and credit to the
American court's judgment. Foreign governments which license and draw
revenue from Internet gambling would most likely not enforce an American
judgment against an Internet gambling operator, as enforcement would have a
negative effect on profits.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Kraig P. Grahmann, Betting on Prohibition: The Federal
Government's Approach to Internet Gambling, 7 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 162, 165
(2009) ("[T]he government usually cannot remedy [the] deceptive practices [of Internet
casinos] because all Internet casinos operate outside the jurisdiction of the United
States".); Joseph J. McBurney, Note, To Regulate or to Prohibit: An Analysis of the
Internet Gambling Industry and the Need for a Decision on the Industry's Future in the
United States, 21 CONN. J. INT'L L. 337, 357 (2006) (describing the United Kingdom's
approach to Internet gambling).
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C. Territorial Jurisdictional Problems with Regulating Internet
Gambling
National regulation is one approach to Internet gambling, but
Internet gambling is an international problem, and without some type of
international treaty, resolving issues of international jurisdiction will
prove difficult.4  Internet gambling cases have caused problems for
traditional international jurisdictional law because most gambling
websites are licensed by foreign entities, resulting in conflicts among
nations due to differing substantive laws about Internet regulations and
policies.49 The international community has made little progress toward
developing a uniform standard for Internet jurisdiction, causing domestic
laws to have a minimal effect on foreign entities that license gambling
websites. 50  The convenience of access to the Internet is part of this
problem: "The touch of a few keystrokes enables people to
communicate, engage in commerce, and interact with others around the
world. This ability to cross international borders without leaving one's
living room has created a jurisdictional void that has yet to be filled."
51
The geography of the Internet world poses a serious problem for
jurisdiction.5 2 An Internet gambling company can conduct its businesses
and locate its servers in a certain location with a website accessible from
anywhere in the world, without having a physical presence established in
a certain area.53 It is extremely difficult to identify the location of a
particular user of gambling websites, which is only exacerbated by
gambling websites' tendency to hide their locations.5 4 In the end:
Traditional principles of international jurisdiction, particularly
territoriality, are poorly suited for this environment of geographic
anonymity. Courts have struggled to develop a satisfactory solution
[to the problem of obtaining jurisdiction over foreign entities that
license Internet gambling websites], yet no progress has been made
toward a uniform global standard of Internet jurisdiction.
55
Without an international treaty for Internet gambling, foreign
countries will continue to undercut the United States' efforts to regulate
Internet gambling. Domestic laws have put a stranglehold on the efforts
48. See generally Meehan, supra note 22 (describing the major issues involved with
international Internet jurisdiction).
49. Id. at 345-46; 348-49.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 345 (footnote omitted).
52. Id. at 348-49.
53. Meehan, supra note 22, at 349; see also Mann, supra note 22, at 9.
54. Meehan, supra note 22, at 349; see also Mann, supra note 22, at 9.
55. Meehan, supra note 22, at 349.
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of individual states to sanction some forms of sports betting with little to
no effect on foreign and illegal sports-betting enterprises.
III. FEDERAL LAWS THAT PREVENT STATES FROM LEGALIZING SPORTS
BETTING
Several domestic laws have attempted to regulate gambling in the
United States.56 The Article's focus is on PASPA and UIGEA, while
56. Other domestic laws include the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2006); the Travel
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2006); and the Illegal Gambling Business Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1955
(2006).
The Wire Act was enacted well before the rise of broadband technology, email, and
websites, and has been found to be the backbone of federal gambling law; it was "one of
the first laws used to question the legality of Internet gambling[.]" See Grahmann, supra
note 47, at 167. The Wire Act prohibits those "engaged in the business of betting or
wagering [from] knowingly us[ing] a wire communication facility for the transmission in
interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers[,]" or for any "wire communication
which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for
information assisting the placing of bets or wagers" on any sporting event or contest. 18
U.S.C. § 1084(a). Ambiguities and limitations on the Wire Act prevent it from having a
significant effect on prohibiting Internet gambling. See, e.g., Weinberg, supra note 47, at
303--04. Weinberg states:
For example, in In re Mastercard Int'l, Inc., . . . the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals interpreted the Wire Act to cover only sporting events, which excludes
Internet gambling casinos from the Wire Act. Furthermore, the Wire Act's
language, 'transmission of a wire communication,' is ambiguous because it
could be construed to include both receiving and sending information, or only
sending information.
Id. See also Grahmann, supra note 47, at 167-68 (discussing whether the Wire Act
applies to non-sports betting and to wireless technologies); Michael J. Vener, Comment,
Internet Gambling Law: Is Prohibition Really Good Policy?, 15 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM.
199, 203 (2008) (providing that one of the Wire Act's main ambiguities comes from the
language "those engaged in the business[,]" which has led courts to conclude that the
Wire Act applies only to businesses and to not private individuals); Frank Ahrens, U.S.
Outlaws Internet Gambling, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 14, 2006, http://bit.ly/IIBCJX ("Courts
have disagreed [with legislators], saying betting on sports teams over the Internet is
illegal, but wagering on casino games, such as poker, is not."); Marc S. Friedman &
Athena Cheng, From Poker to the Pokey: The Laws Governing Online Gambling,
LAW.COM (July 14, 2006), http://bit.ly/ I fPAxQR.
The Travel Act prohibits using a facility in interstate commerce to intentionally
conduct an unlawful activity. 18 U.S.C. §1952(a); see also Vener, supra, at 204 (noting
that two prongs must be met to constitute a violation of the Travel Act-the defendant
must be a business and that business must violate federal or state law). The Travel Act
suffers from some of the same problems as the Wire Act, specifically that only operators,
and not bettors, can violate the Travel Act. See Vener, supra, at 204.
The Illegal Gambling Business Act makes it a crime to conduct a gambling
enterprise that is prohibited in the state in which the activity occurs if the enterprise
"involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own
all or part of such business[,]" and if it is in continuous operations for more than 30 days
or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in a single day. 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a)-(b). Because the
Illegal Gambling Business Act and the Travel Act depend on the illegality of Internet
gambling in the states, they have ultimately been unsuccessful in curtailing Internet
gambling because whether Internet gambling is illegal in the states remains an open
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considering the past and present challenges to PASPA, and the
ineffectiveness of UIGEA to prevent Internet sports gambling.
A. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
PASPA is the major federal law that stands in the way of legalized
sports betting. Congress, pursuant to an 88-to-5 vote in the Senate,
57
enacted PASPA in 1992 to stop the spread of gambling on professional
and amateur sports. To that end, PASPA made it unlawful for a state to
authorize a sports wagering system, except for the states with preexisting
sports wagering laws. The proponents of the bill worried that state-
sanctioned sports betting would send the message to youth that sports are
not about sportsmanship and personal achievement, but about money.58
The proponents of PASPA opined that making sports betting illegal in
the United States would prevent our national pastimes from being
compromised by sports betting and help curtail the problems with
gambling among the American youth.59 These proponents were also
concerned about the association between sports betting and organized
crime and corruption.6" Ultimately, PASPA's proponents argued that the
question. Ultimately, the Acts overlook and fail to address the applicable "process by
which electronic gaming fundamentally occurs." See John D. Andrle, A Winning Hand-
A Proposal for an International Regulatory Schema with Respect to the Growing Online
Gambling Dilemma in the United States, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1389, 1397 (2004).
57. See U.S. Senate Roll Call Votes, 102nd Congress-2nd Session, U.S. SENATE:
LEGISLATION & REcoRDs, http://l.usa.gov/lgYRoDN (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
58. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992: Hearing on H.R. 74
Before the Subcomm. on Econ. & Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong. (1991) [hereinafter Hearings] (citing Ricardo Chavira, The Rise of Teenage
Gambling. A Distressing Number of Youths Are Bitten Early by the Betting Bug, TIME,
Feb. 25, 1991, at 78 (reporting that gambling counselors had previously stated that very
few of their patients were teenagers, but that around the time of PASPA's enactment,
about seven percent of their problem gambling cases involved teenagers)). The author
also mentioned two studies that had been conducted on the problems with teenage
gambling: one by California psychologist Durand Jacobs, in which Jacobs surveyed
2,700 high school students in four different states and concluded that students are two-
and-a-half times more vulnerable to become problem gamblers than adults; another by
Henry Lesieur, a sociologist at St. John's University, who revealed that there are eight
times as many gambling addicts among college students as among adults. See Chavira,
supra.
59. See Bradley & Murphy, supra note 12, at 5-6.
60. See generally Aaron J. Slavin, Comment, The "Las Vegas Loophole" and the
Current Push in Congress Towards a Blanket Prohibition on Collegiate Sports
Gambling, 10 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REv. 715, 727-29 (2002) (citing United States v. Burke,
700 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1983)). One notorious scandal was the Boston College point
shaving scheme in which Rocco and Anthony Perla paid Boston College center Rick
Kuhn a bonus for throwing a game or playing with less than full effort so that they would
win by betting against Boston College. For example, if the point spread was Boston
College minus 8 (meaning that Boston College would need to win by at least 9 points for
a bet on Boston College to be successful), the Perlas would bet against Boston College
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revenues earned through sports gambling are not enough to justify the
problems it creates.6 1
PASPA provides that it is unlawful for:
(1) a governmental entity to sponsor, operate, advertise,
promote, license, or authorize by law or compact, or
(2) a person to sponsor, operate, advertise, or promote,
pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental entity,
a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering
scheme based, directly or indirectly (through the use of geographical
references or otherwise), on one or more competitive games in which
amateur or professional athletes participate, or are intended to
participate, or on one or more performances of such athletes in such
62games.
States are only allowed to conduct sports-betting schemes as they did
between 1976 and 1990; if a state did not conduct a sports-betting
scheme at that time, it will never be able to conduct a sports-betting
scheme unless PASPA is modified.63
With so much money being wagered illegally on sports every year,
it is evident that PASPA has not curtailed sports betting in the United
States. 64 Although proponents of PASPA had good intentions when
enacting the law, the Internet has made PASPA obsolete. Sports betting
occurs all over the world; with so many websites outside of the United
States welcoming sports bets, the only possible solution to restricting the
development of sports betting overall would be some type of
international law, which is beyond the scope of this project. Frankly, no
domestic law can tame an international animal as large as sports betting.
Sports betting persists unregulated through illegal and offshore
betting schemes and continues to deprive states of much needed
revenues. The fiscal benefits that states can derive from state sanctioned
sports-betting schemes now outweigh PASPA's initial, well-intended
benefits. Although PASPA is the law, it faced vehement opposition from
state lotteries and state legislatures when it was enacted in 1992, and
continues to face such opposition.
and Kuhn would attempt to make Boston College win by less than 9 points. As a result,
Kuhn would receive a bonus for his deliberate poor play, usually about $2,500 per
incident. See id.
61. S. REP. No. 102-248, at 7 (1991).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2006).
63. See Bradley & Murphy, supra note 12, at 9-10.
64. See supra Part H.A.




Historically, the federal government has left the regulation of
gambling to the states pursuant to states' Tenth Amendment powers,
which allow them to regulate intrastate activity.66  This background
prompted Donna Sytek, 67 a member of the New Hampshire House of
Representatives who opposed PASPA, to comment:
For Congress to preempt this state authority is an unwarranted and
unnecessary intrusion into the affairs of state governments and
another blow to principles of federalism. In our view, states must
have maximum flexibility in exploring all possible revenue options,
including sports lotteries, to balance their budgets and provide needed
services.
States need every opportunity to explore revenue-generating
avenues in these dire financial times. A recent survey observed that
"[t]he 50 states are facing one of the worst fiscal periods in decades.",
69
Instead of allowing a state to determine for itself whether it wants to
conduct a sports-betting scheme within its borders, PASPA has left
American sports bettors at the whim of illegal and foreign outfits. Also,
PASPA discriminates among the states and has, in effect, given Nevada a
virtual monopoly on legal sports betting.70 Without modification, illegal
and foreign gambling outfits will continue to prosper on American
dollars. Unfortunately for opponents of PASPA, past challenges to
gambling statutes have been unsuccessful,7 1 and two recent challenges to
66. See Slavin, supra note 60, at 740; see also Bradley & Murphy, supra note 12, at
11.
67. Representative Sytek spoke on behalf of the National Conference of State
Legislatures.
68. Hearings, supra note 58, at 62. Thomas O'Heir, Director of the Massachusetts
State Lottery, also testified during these hearings: "[I]ssues of lotteries and wagering
have traditionally been issues for the states to resolve .... Congress should not be telling
the states how they can or cannot raise revenue. This is particularly true when Congress
is discriminating between the states, as this legislation blatantly does." Id. at 68.
69. NAT'L GOVERNORS ASS'N & NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE
FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES, at vii (June 2009), available at http://bit.ly/HVzTVV.
70. See Michael C. Macchiarola, Securities Linked to the Performance of Tiger
Woods? Not Such a Long Shot, 42 CREIG4TON L. REV. 29, 30 (2008); see also Phil
Sheridan, Hypocrisy on Delaware Sports Betting, PHILA. INQUIRER, May 19, 2009, at D1
("If anything, the legal obstacles to sports gambling serve mostly to give Las Vegas a
monopoly-which is about as un-American an idea as you can imagine.").
71. See, e.g., United States v. Smaldone, 485 F.2d 1333, 1342 (10th Cir. 1973)
(rejecting defendants' argument that a federal anti-gambling statute violates the
Commerce Clause because Congress is attempting to regulate intrastate activities);
United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230, 233 (2d Cir. 1972) (rejecting defendants'
argument that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause by enacting a
federal gambling statute); United States v. Riehl, 460 F.2d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 1972)
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PASPA from the states of New Jersey and Delaware have also failed,
providing the backdrop to NCAA v. Christie.
2. New Jersey's Case (2009): hIteractive Media Entertainment
& Gaming Association, Inc. v. Holder
On March 23, 2009, a group that included New Jersey State Senator
Raymond Lesniak and representatives from the gaming industries in
New Jersey filed a suit to overturn PASPA, arguing that it violates the
U.S. Constitution.7 2 The plaintiffs contended that PASPA discriminates
against New Jersey and violates the Fourteenth Amendment because it
allows the four states that had operated sports betting between 1976 and
1990 to continue to do so but does not allow any other states to conduct
sports-betting schemes.73 The plaintiffs also argued that PASPA violates
the Fifth Amendment, as it is unduly overbroad and vague.74
Furthermore, the plaintiffs stated that PASPA violates the Commerce
Clause because it fails to impose uniform standards for sports betting
75throughout the United States. Ultimately, the group's claim was
unsuccessful; the case was dismissed for lack of standing. 76
Senator Lesniak believed that PASPA deprives states of a vast
economic endeavor that is enjoyed by foreign Internet licensing
companies and illegal outfits, stating that, "[PASPA] deprives the State
of New Jersey of over $100 million of yearly revenues, as well as
depriving our casinos, racetracks and Internet operators of over $500
million in gross income., 77 New Jersey State Senator Jeff Van Drew
stated that this cannot await a constitutional court challenge which could
78take years.
(rejecting defendants' argument that Congress lacked any rational basis in determining
that intrastate gambling affects interstate commerce); United States v. Harris, 460 F.2d
1041, 1049 (5th Cir. 1972) (rejecting defendants' argument that the right to regulate local
gambling activity is to be reserved to the states).
72. Interactive Media Entm't & Gaming Ass'n, Inc. v. Holder, No. 09-1301 (GEB),
2011 WL 802106 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011); see also generally Jon Hurdle, New Jersey Files
Suit on Sports-Betting Ban, REUTERS (Mar. 23, 2009, 6:20 PM), http://reut.rs/Ilzimo
(summarizing New Jersey's challenge to PASPA).
73. Id. See also Lesniak Announces Sports Betting Lawsuit, N.J. SENATE
DEMOCRATS (Mar. 23, 2009), http://bit.1y/1aBYyc0 [hereinafter Lesniak Announcement].
74. See Lesniak Announcement, supra note 73.
75. See generally Hurdle, supra note 72.
76. See Holder, 2011 WL 802106, at*1.
77. Hurdle, supra note 72.
78. See Press Release, N.J. Senate Democratic Office, Lesniak-Van Drew
Constitutional Amendment to Allow for Sports Wagering Advances (Feb. 8, 2010),
available at http://bit.ly/1 dOQiWZ; Hurdle, supra note 72 ("We cannot afford to be na've
about illegal sports betting.").
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As of 2009, New Jersey had been unsuccessful in its efforts to
implement a sports-betting scheme. Its legislature proposed a bill that
would have legalized in-person wagering on sports events in New Jersey
casinos, but it was struck down as a violation of PASPA. 79 This defeat
was particularly unfortunate because New Jersey faced a budget deficit
of $2.2 billion at the time. 80
3. Delaware's Case (2009): Office of the Commissioner of
Baseball v. Markell
Delaware's Governor, Jack Markell, signed into legislation the
Sports Lottery Act 8' (the "Delaware Act") that allowed Delaware's
current sports-betting operation to expand beyond what it offered
between 1976 and 1990.82 Essentially, the Delaware Act would allow
betting on sports other than football, and for single-game bets on
football. 83 Governor Markell expected to bring in $50 million to $100
million in revenue from the Delaware Act, which would significantly
help Delaware's projected $700 million budget deficit. 84  On July 24,
2009, all major and collegiate sports leagues and associations 85 filed a
suit claiming that elements of Delaware's proposed sports-betting
scheme violated PASPA.86 Four days after the complaint was filed, the
major and collegiate sports leagues and associations filed for a
preliminary injunction.
87
Delaware argued that its expansion of sports betting did not violate
PASPA, interpreting the PASPA exemption to allow the state to expand
79. See Press Release, N.J. Senate Democratic Office, supra note 78, see also
Lesniak Announcement, supra note 73.
80. See Jon Hurdle, New Jersey Governor Declares Fiscal Emergency, REUTERS
(Feb. 11, 2010, 4:14 PM), http://reut.rs/bOsGvl.
81. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 4825 (West 2012).
82. See Office of Comm'r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 304 (3d Cir. 2009)
(stating that the purpose of the Delaware Act was to allow betting on sports other than
football and single-bet action on football when Delaware was only offering three-game
parlay bets on football when PASPA enacted).
83. Id. at 295-96.
84. See Chad Millman, Jack Markell Is Ready to Legalize Sports Betting in
Delaware, ESPN THE MAGAZINE (Mar. 10, 2009), http://es.pn/LjDz.
85. The leagues and associations that filed suit against Delaware's proposed sports-
betting scheme were the National Football League, National Basketball Association,
National Hockey League, Major League Baseball, and the National Collegiate Athletic
Association.
86. Verified Complaint at 2-3, Office of Comm'r of Baseball v. Markell, No. 09-538
(D. Del. July 24, 2009), 2009 WL 2378572.
87. Plaintiffs' Opening Brief in Support of Their Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
Office of Comm'r of Baseball v. Markell, No. 09-538 (D. Del. July 28, 2009), 2009 WL
4899717.
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its sports-betting scheme. 88  The pertinent contest was over specific
language in PASPA indicating that states are allowed to conduct sports
betting "to the extent the scheme was conducted" between 1976 and
1990.89 Delaware argued that if a state conducted sports betting between
1976 and 1990, then it could continue to allow betting on sports to the
fullest extent that it wished, including taking any type of bet on all
sports.90 The Third Circuit disagreed, construing this section to mean
that states could conduct sports betting exactly and no further than they
did between 1976 and 1990. 9'
Although not presented with a direct constitutional challenge to
PASPA, the Third Circuit found that PASPA was "not ... ambiguous. 92
In addition, the Markell court held the argument that a state's sovereignty
requires it to be permitted to implement a betting scheme of that state's
choosing "unpersuasive. 93  The Markell court also recognized the
"grandfathering" provisions of PASPA, stating that "[a]lthough PASPA
has broadly prohibited state-sponsored sports gambling since it took
effect on January 1, 1993, the statute also 'grandfathered' gambling
schemes in individual states 'to the extent that the scheme was conducted
by that State' between 1976 and 1990.,,
94
This ruling meant that Delaware could only offer three-game parlay
bets on football games because that was the extent to which it conducted
sports betting between 1976 and 1990. 95 The Third Circuit held that
elements of Delaware's sports-betting act violated PASPA, 96 and after
remand, the district court permanently enjoined Delaware from
implementing its proposed betting scheme. 97 Delaware then petitioned
88. See Office of Comm'r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 301 (3d Cir. 2009).
89. Id. at 300-01.
90. See id at 301.
91. Id. at 301-02.
92. Id. at 302.
93. Markell, 579 F.3d at 303.
94. Id. at 296-97.
95. See id. at 303-04. A simple example shows why Delaware wanted to be able to
offer single-game bets instead of only offering parlay bets. Let us say Mr. Sports Bettor,
who lives in Delaware, wants to place a $5,000 bet on the Super Bowl. He goes into his
local Delaware casino to make this bet. Mr. Bettor tells the casino that he would like to
bet $5,000 on the Arizona Cardinals to win the Super Bowl. The casino informs Mr.
Bettor that he cannot place a single bet on the Super Bowl because, in Delaware, sports
bettors can only place three-game parlay bets. So, to bet his $5,000, he will have to bet
on three different games and win all of them to win any money. He will get the implied
odds for taking such a risk, but if any of the three bets fails, then he loses all his money.
A sports bettor who just wants to make a single bet on the Super Bowl will either call his
local bookie or go to an Internet sports betting website to make his bet.
96. Id. at 304.




the Supreme Court of the United States for writ of certiorari, but it was
denied.98
B. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
Congress' most recent move to combat the problems associated
with Internet gambling is the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act of 2006. 99  Legislators signed the bill'00 into law right before
Congress recessed in 2006, and it was approved by a vote of 409 to 2.101
UIGEA contains a thorough regulatory scheme that affects and
limits the activity of parties and enterprises involved in Internet
gambling, including financial transaction providers and payment
systems. 102  To prevent Americans from gambling online, Congress
turned its attention to payment methods used to fund Internet
gambling. 0 3  Section 5363, the "[p]rohibition on acceptance of any
financial instrument for unlawful [I]nternet gambling," reads:
No person engaged in the business of betting or wagering may
knowingly accept, in connection with the participation of another
person in unlawful Internet gambling-
(1) credit.., extended to or on behalf of such other person
(2) an electronic fund transfer... from or on behalf of such
other person;
(3) any check, draft, or similar instrument which is drawn by
or on behalf of such other person and is drawn on or payable at
or through any financial institution; or
(4) the proceeds of any other form of financial transaction...
which involves a financial institution as a payor or financial
intermediary on behalf of or for the benefit of such other
104
person.
98. Markell v. Office of Comm'r of Baseball, 130 S. Ct. 2403 (2010) (mem.),
denying cert. to 579 F.3d 293 (3d Cir. 2009).
99. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367 (2006).
100. Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act), Pub.
L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884 (codified in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C. and 31 U.S.C.),
available at http://I .usa.gov/lbLyUCK.
101. Final Vote Results for Roll Call 516, OFF. CLERK, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES
(Sept. 30, 2006, 12:32 AM), http://1.usa.gov/lbVAosC.
102. See Marconi et al., supra note 34, at 603.
103. See id.
104. 31 U.S.C. § 5363.
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However, a major problem with UIGEA, through all its structural jargon,
is that it does not explicitly make Internet gambling illegal; it just tries to
restrict "the mechanism by which an online account is funded.' 0 5 This
factor has led to the opportunity to circumvent UIGEA through a creative
banking industry with financial instruments that are not restricted by
anti-gambling prohibitions.0 6 UIGEA's rule of construction that "[n]o
provision of this [Act] shall be construed as altering, limiting, or
extending any Federal or State law or Tribal-State compact prohibiting,
permitting, or regulating gambling within the United States"10 7 is also
problematic. Commentators interpret this section to mean that gambling
is only prohibited when it violates a state or federal law; thus UIGEA
does not expand the scope of federal law.108 As a result, UIGEA only
enforces laws that have already been enacted. 09 In the context of this
Article, UIGEA simply enforces the prohibitions of PASPA, but as
applied to the Internet. 110
UIGEA fails to remove a previously existing gap in online
gambling because gamblers can simply use a foreign third-party money
transfer to avoid a transaction between United States financing
institutions and the Internet gambling business.' Internet gambling
businesses that use foreign card systems for funding will not be subject
to UIGEA." 2 Ultimately, UIGEA does not achieve its stated intentions
of prohibiting parties in the United States from placing sports bets on the
Internet. All a potential sports bettor in the United States must do is fund
his or her accounts through third-party payment processors that are not
105. Allyn Jaffrey Shulman, Legal Landscape of Online Gaming Has Not Changed,
CARDPLAYER.COM (Oct. 5, 2006), http://bit.ly/ IgYRQSD.
106. See generally Grahmann, supra note 47, at 177.
107. 31 U.S.C. § 5361.
108. See generally Jessica M. Gulash, The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act's Effects on the Online Gambling Industry, U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL'Y (Apr. 1,
2007), http://bit.ly/1845i4U (concluding that sports betting continues to be the only form
of online gambling that violates federal law).
109. See Shulman, supra note 105. Some legislators promoting the UIGEA believe
that Internet gambling is already illegal via the Wire Act, and thus contend that
prohibiting U.S. customers from funding their online accounts will prevent U.S.
customers from gambling online, even where the jurisdictional reach of the Wire Act
formerly prevented them from doing so. See id To the contrary, UIGEA "applies, if and
only if, the gambling is already illegal under current law." Id But cf United States v.
Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 78 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming conviction under the Wire Act of the
owner of an Antigua bookmaking company for placing sports bets on behalf of New
York customers).
110. See id
111. Nelson Rose, New UIGEA Regs Put Benefits and Burdens on States, 13 GAMING
L. REv. & ECON. 1,4 (2009).
112. See Joseph M. Kelly, Financial Transaction Providers Needn't Worry Too Much
About Complying with UIGEA Rules, 13 GAMING L. REV. &EcoN. 196,201 (2009).
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covered by UIGEA. 113 On the other end, sports-betting websites can
bypass UIGEA's restrictions by simply operating under a foreign
license. 114
UIGEA and PASPA combine to restrict 46 states from operating a
sports-betting scheme within their borders, but fail to curtail sports
betting. As such, PASPA should be modified to allow states to
experiment with their own sports-betting schemes in light of all the
benefits that can be derived from state-sanctioned sports betting, not only
because the laws thus far are ineffective, but also because its
constitutionality is, again, suspect and being challenged in NCAA v.
Christie.
IV. NCAA v. CHRISIE
On January 17, 2012, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed
into law New Jersey's Sports Wagering Law,115 an act passed by the
New Jersey State Legislature to permit wagering at casinos and
racetracks on the results of certain collegiate and professional sports or
athletic events." 6 If the gambling law becomes effective, casinos and
racetracks across New Jersey will be able to apply for licenses and
commence gambling operations on amateur and professional sports. 117
On August 7, 2012, the NCAA, along with the MLB, NFL, NBA,
and NHL (collectively, "the Leagues"), filed suit in the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Jersey" 8 alleging that the Sports Wagering
Law enacted by New Jersey violates the terms of PASPA. "9 The NCAA
and the Leagues sued Governor Christie and other state officials to
prevent the implementation of New Jersey's Sports Wagering Law. New
Jersey and other defendants who intervened in the case argue that
PASPA violates the U.S. Constitution and cannot be used by the NCAA
and the Leagues to prevent the implementation of legalized sports
wagering. The NCAA and the Leagues disagree. If New Jersey is
correct, it will be permitted to enact its proposed sports-wagering
scheme. If it is not, New Jersey will be prohibited from enacting sports
wagering because PASPA, as a federal law, overrides New Jersey's law.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 5:12A-1 to -6 (West 2012).
116. See, e.g., Matt Friedman, Gov. Christie Signs Bill Allowing Gamblers to Place
Bets on Pro, College Sports Teams, STAR-LEDGER (Jan. 17, 2012, 3:28 PM),
http://bit.ly/yaUdx6.
117. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-2 (West 2012).
118. See generally Christie Complaint, supra note 3.
119. Id. at 10.
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The NCAA and the Leagues argue that "[g]ambling on amateur and
professional sports threatens the integrity of ... sports and is
fundamentally at odds" with the principles of integrity associated with
sports.120 The NCAA and the Leagues further argue that the proliferation
of sports gambling "threatens to harm the reputation" of the Association
and the major leagues, and could "adversely affect the way the public
views amateur and professional sports., 12' New Jersey counters that the
NCAA and the Leagues lack standing to enforce PASPA 122 and that
PASPA is unconstitutional because it treats states unfairly and
commandeers a state's right by requiring local officials ban sports
gambling. 1
23
On February 28, 2013, the opinion of District Judge Shipp in this
case stated several findings. First, the court noted that "PASPA is a
rational expression of Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause...
that PASPA allows legalized sports wagering to continue in those states
where it was lawful at the time of its enactment does not deprive the
statute of constitutionality because Supreme Court precedent permits
'grandfathering."" 124 The court then said that "PASPA does not violate
the Tenth Amendment because it does not force New Jersey to take any
legislative, executive, or regulatory action," and also "does not raise the
political accountability concerns outlined by the Supreme Court's Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence."'' 25  Lastly, "regarding [New Jersey's]
additional allegations, the [c]ourt... determined that Congress had a
rational basis to enact PASPA in the manner it chose.'
126
The court added:
Although some of the questions raised in this case are novel, judicial
intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwise a court
considers a policy decision of the legislative branch. As such, to the
extent the people of New Jersey disagree with PASPA, their remedy
is not through passage of a state law or through the judiciary, but
through the repeal or amendment of PASPA in Congress.1
27
Although this Article does not address the constitutionality of PASPA, it
discusses reasons Congress should modify PASPA.
120. Id. at 3.
121. Id.
122. Answer & Affirmative Defenses of Defendants Christopher J. Christie, David L.
Rebuck, & Frank Zanzuccki at 7, NCAA v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551 (D.N.J. 2013)
(No. 3:12-cv-04947), 2013 WL 328197.
123. Id.
124. NCAA v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 554-55 (D.N.J. 2013).





V. REASONS TO ALLOW STATES TO LAWFULLY REGULATE SPORTS-
BETTING SCHEMES
Despite PASPA's noble, stated policy objectives, the proliferation
of Internet sportsbooks since 1992 has significantly increased the levels
of sports gambling activity in the United States. As such, sports
gambling is not as taboo in a "Pete Rose" sense as it historically was. In
fact, the mainstream public has generally accepted various forms of
sports-betting activities, such as fantasy sports leagues, NCAA March
Madness office pools, Super Bowl squares, and widely accessible betting
lines and game spreads in newspapers and online pregame reports.
However, even with increased sports-betting activities since the online
boom of the '90s, the public interest and fan base of professional and
amateur sports has not waned, as popularity and revenues are at an all-
time high.1 28  In fact, in 2009, NBA Commissioner David Stern
acknowledged this shift in the public perception of sports gambling in a
Sports Illustrated interview, when he remarked: "'[Gambling] may be a
little immoral, because it really is a tax on the poor.... But having said
that, it's now a matter of national policy: Gambling is good."1
29
In recognizing this shift in the perception of sports betting from
being amoral conduct to a potentially beneficial activity, allowing states
to regulate their own sports-betting schemes would empower them to
derive much-needed tax revenues and income from the legitimate sports-
betting industry and would help get American dollars back to the
states. 30 Individual states acting as laboratories for experiment could
128. Compare Sports Industry Overview, PLUNKETT RESEARCH, LTD.,
http://bit.ly/HsMXhJ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013), with Discrepancies in NF.L. Revenue,
N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1992, http://nyti.ms/bFQVi2 (showing that revenues for the National
Football League in 2011-2012 were estimated to be about $9 billion, compared with only
$1.3 billion in 1990).
129. Ian Thomsen, Weekly Countdown: Stern Open to Legalized Betting, Rule
Changes, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (DEC. 11, 2009, 2:26 PM), http://bit.ly/819nSh. Also, in
his 2009 Sports Illustrated interview, Commissioner Stern believed that the policies
driving the prohibition of sports gambling were "'formulated at a time when gambling
was far less widespread' and that a new approach regarding sports betting is needed. Id.
He stated that "'we have moved to a point where that leap [to regulated sports gambling]
is a possibility .... Id.
130. States Move to Collect New Revenue from Sports Gambling for Critical
Government Programs, SAFE AND SECURE INTERNET GAMBLING INITIATIVE,
http://bit.ly/laNyAPo (last visited Nov. 1, 2013) [hereinafter States Move]. Jeffrey
Sandman, spokesperson for the Safe and Secure Internet Gambling Initiative, stated:
While some form of gambling is allowable in almost every state, it is totally
hypocritical that there would be a line drawn in the sand for sports gambling,
an activity that continues and is estimated to illegally generate up to $380
billion per year in the U.S.... A prohibition on sports gambling means that
billions of dollars in much-needed tax revenue that could be used for education
and other government programs is being lost to bookies and off-shore Internet
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best help states capture the billions of dollars in tax revenue and income
lost to illegal sports betting, and in time could lead to a national solution
for the regulation of sports betting.
States can directly capture revenue from sports betting by the
increase in taxes that they will derive from taking sports bets. States can
also benefit indirectly by being able to provide more jobs for their
citizens with the opening of sportsbooks in their casinos. Finally, and
most importantly, by allowing states to conduct their own sports-betting
schemes, the billions of dollars yearly that are going to offshore
companies and illegal sports-betting outfits would instead go to
individual states that hope to climb out of their current fiscal demise.
Given that many states are dealing with severe financial problems as 48
of the 50 states are "faced [with] real-time or projected funding
shortages[,]' 131 this increase in revenue would be invaluable.
Additionally, the National Gambling Impact Study Commission
acknowledges that introducing legalized, but regulated, sports gambling
in the United States would "undermin[e] illegal gambling and the
organized crime it supports.' 1 32  As we see with the foreign online
sportsbook industry, the sports-gambling industry is largely run by big
businesses; these businesses are closely regulated in their jurisdictions,
which strongly disincentivizes betting scandals that could bruise their
credibility and expose them to liability. 133 Additionally, the regulation of
the sports-gambling industry would likely provide an impetus for this
legal, but regulated, sports-gambling business to self-regulate to protect
gambling operators. . . . Rather than trying to stop consenting adults from
doing something that's enjoyable to them, specifically, betting on sports, poker
or other games, Congress and our state governments should look to legalize and
regulate land-based and Internet gambling activities as a way to protect
consumers and recoup billions in revenue[.]
Id.
131. M. Alex Johnson, Budget Crises Swamp the States, NBCNEWS.COM, (MAY 26,
2009, 6:28 AM), available at http://nbcnews.to/17Gwt5n. See also STATE BUDGET CRISIS
TASK FORCE, FULL REPORT 6 (2012), available at http://bit.ly/LWgGEY. In fact,
currently state governments are suffering through the most severe fiscal crises in decades.
According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, the 2007 recession "caused the
largest collapse in state revenues on record[,]" and, although revenues began to grow
again in 2010, they were "not growing fast enough to recover fully soon." Phil Oliff et
al., States Continue to Feel Recession's Impact, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITIES,
http://bit.ly/WDaOM (last updated June 27, 2012). See also Jeremy Gerst & Daniel
Wilson, Fiscal Crises of the State: Causes and Consequences, FED. RES. BANK S.F. (June
28, 2010), http://bit.ly/90vwYY. And, already, 31 states are projecting or addressing
budget shortfalls totaling $55 billion for the 2013 fiscal year. See Oliffet al., supra.
132. GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 9, at 1-5.
133. For example, the United Kingdom's sportsbook company William Hill has a
market value of over £1 billion and is one of several gambling companies publicly traded
on the London Stock Exchange. See Key Facts, WILLIAM HILL, http://bit.ly/ldbqpV4
(last visited Nov. 1, 2013).
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the integrity of the business. 3 4 And, business need not remain powerless
against organized crime; rather than risk fraudulent losses to their own
revenues due to the activities of racketeers, they will be motivated to
alert the authorities of suspicious or irregular sports-betting activities."'
This positive incentive rebuts Congress's prediction at the time it enacted
PASPA: that increased sports-betting activities would lead to more
scandal and corruption. 136 To the contrary, state-regulated sports-betting
schemes should generate robust oversight of suspicious and illegal
sports-betting activity. This oversight will serve to prevent future sports-
betting scandals and fraud, which will ultimately help to preserve the
integrity of professional and amateur sports in the United States. As
such, Congress should modify PASPA to allow states to experiment with
sports-betting schemes.
A. States as Laboratories for Experiment
The theory of states as laboratories for experimentation derives
from the foundations of federalism. Justice Brandeis, dissenting in New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann,'37 opined that states can make substantial
contributions as experimental laboratories for the development of
economic programs. 38  Justice Brandeis viewed this experimental
laboratory theory as a progressive, small-scale, and low-risk
undertaking. 139 Justice Brandeis wrote:
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious
consequences to the nation. l401 It is one of the happy incidents of the
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
134. See John Pierik, Bets Deals an Integrity Issue: AFL, NORTHERN DAILY LEADER
(May 22, 2013, 3:00 AM), http:/Ibit.ly/laHNsmR (describing steps taken to ensure
integrity in Australian sports betting, noting that "[t]he [Australian Football League] has
deals with betting agencies, allowing it to check on irregular practices, which have
already resulted in players and officials being caught for gambling on matches").
135. See supra note 134; see also How Is Online Poker Regulated, ONLINE POKER
SITES, http://bit.ly/IbLEjX2 (last visited Nov. 23, 2013) ("[T]he ability to monitor and
self-regulate the games independently decreases the likelihood of being cheated or falling
victim to scams.").
136. See S. REP. No. 102-248, at 6 (1992) ("The committee recognizes that sports
gambling offers a potential source of revenue for the States, but ... believes the risk to
the reputation of one of our Nation's most popular pastimes, professional and amateur
sporting events, is not worth it.").
137. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
138. ld. at 311.
139. See Marcus, supra note 14, at 78, 87.
140. Arguably the amount of money that is illegally wagered on sports each year is
the evil that has resulted from not allowing states to experiment with their own sports-
betting schemes.
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choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country. 1
4 1
Every state is different and has a variety of needs; as a result, if
states are allowed to experiment with sports betting, each would find its
own solution to deriving tax revenue and income from legitimate
regulation of the sports-betting industry within its jurisdiction. 142 For
example, some states may operate a sports-betting scheme themselves,
overseeing the administration and logistics of the scheme, 143 whereas
other states may merely sanction and license sports betting, allowing
private casinos to compete with each other and offer varying odds,
payouts, and incentives to attract more gamblers.' 44 States that choose to
operate their own sports-betting schemes might decide to do so in a
manner similar to how they provide traditional lotteries, by offering
"tickets" at various retailers licensed to sell them. States with Indian
casinos may also need to address additional considerations that states
without Indian casinos can avoid. 1
45
As discussed above, most U.S. sports bettors place their sports bets
online. 46  Although the reason for this online "preference" may be
necessity because there are likely no local, legal places for those
gamblers to place sports bets, sports bettors are nonetheless accustomed
to betting online. Perhaps a trailblazing state may find that offering in-
state online sports betting is the best way to attract sports bettors from
141. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311.
142. Of course, states can draft their own sports-betting schemes that address some of
the concerns that prompted PASPA in the first place. For example, Delaware and
California have had bills with provisions prohibiting wagering on state college sports.
This shows that those states recognize the possible corrupting influence sports gambling
can have on amateur athletics, while still allowing for the possibility of gambling on
professional sports. Also, perhaps future state sports-betting bills can be drafted to
prevent current or former amateur or professional athletes from being eligible to win
sports bets; incidentally, although I think such a provision would survive constitutional
scrutiny, I doubt this would work on a practical level, but who knows what a creative
legislator could come up with. Along the same lines, to address the concerns of those
who are pro-PASPA, these laws could also set aside money to combat gambling
addiction and gambling destitution, provisions which the California bill included.
143. This seems to be the approach that Delaware wanted to take with its proposed
sports lottery, offering "sports lottery agent" licenses to qualified applicants. See H.R.
100, 145th Gen. Assemb. (Del. 2009), available at http://l.usa.gov/lbKizyg.
144. In early 2013, California also attempted to legalize sports betting by permitting
authorized operators of gambling establishments to offer sports betting. See S. 190,
2013-2014 Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at http://bit.ly/ljhbC8z.
145. See id. (including provisions relating to the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act of 1988).
146. See supra Part ll.B.
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the foreign websites. This option, though, could potentially face many
legal hurdles that land-based sports betting would not. 147
Furthermore, thorough testing by states in a variety of contexts
could lead to a national solution for the regulation of sports betting that
could be implemented nationwide if Congress wished to continue to
regulate sports betting. Experimentation will be safeguarded by what
Justice Brandeis said is the power of the Court to strike down a statute
that arises from experimentation if it is found to be "arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable."1 48  And, the notion that liberalization of federal
regulation to allow for state experimentation is desirable is not that far-
fetched.
In fact, "[iln recent years .... there have been a number of
[c]ongressional bills proposed that would relax some of the rules related
to interstate online gambling" with the payment of a federal licensing
fee. 149 Additionally, despite the current federal government's flat-ban
approach to Internet gambling, "it is generally understood that the states
retain control over whether to prohibit or regulate online gambling within
their borders, based on certain caveats contained within the Wire Act and
UIGEA."' 5° For example, UIGEA does not prohibit purely intrastate
wagering so long as certain conditions are met. 1
5 1
147. These legal hurdles are beyond the scope of this Article. It is worth mentioning,
however, that the Department of Justice argued that although it no longer interprets the
Wire Act as prohibiting all forms of Internet gambling involving interstate commerce, the
Wire Act clearly still prohibits Internet sports gambling involving interstate commerce.
See generally Virginia A. Seitz, Whether Proposals by Illinois and New York to Use the
Internet and Out-of-State Transaction Processors to Sell Lottery Tickets to In-State
Adults Violate the Wire Act, Memorandum Opinion for the Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division, U.S. DEPT. JUST. (Sept. 20, 2011), http://l.usa.gov/rB9Y6E. For
states to be able to offer online sports betting, either: (i) Congress would need to amend
the Wire Act; or (ii) online sports betting could only be available to people located in the
state and the state likely would have to argue successfully that such online sports betting
would not be involved in interstate commerce-quite a tall order.
148. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
149. Entertainment, Media and Communications Tax Newsletter, PwC 2 (Dec. 2011),
http://pwc.to/lamUj54. Examples of these congressional bills include: the Internet
Gambling Regulation, Consumer Protection, and Enforcement Act, H.R. 2267, 11 1th
Cong. (2009); the Internet Gambling Regulation and Tax Enforcement Act, H.R. 4976,
111 th Cong. (2010); and the Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification Act, S. 3018,
111 th Cong. (2010). Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. (noting that intrastate gambling is legal under UIGEA, "provided that the
state verifies the age and in-state presence of the person gambling"). The newsletter also
states:
With the technological ability to monitor accurately a person's exact location,
through geolocation, the barrier to intrastate regulation and taxation of Internet
gambling may be removed. Just as importantly, states may be able to monitor
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State regulation of sports betting is the most feasible option, as it
should be up to the states to decide if they find sports betting repugnant
to their populations or whether they should allow this type of gambling.
Support for state regulation of gambling within state lines comes via
Congress's policy findings in enacting the Interstate Horse Racing Act. 152
Congress allows states to regulate their own horse-betting schemes
because "[s]tates should have the primary responsibility for determining
what forms of gambling may legally take place within their borders.,
153
However, with billions of dollars currently being sent from the United
States to offshore sports-betting websites and to foreign and illegal
sports-betting schemes, state experimentation is currently the best
solution to derive revenues from the regulation of sports gambling for
those states that want to.
B. How States Can Benefit from Sports Betting
In 1992, when Congress enacted PASPA to prevent the growth of
state-regulated sports gambling, it predicted that the potential harms
created from legalized state-sponsored sports betting were too great to
outweigh the benefits of such sports-betting schemes. 154 However, the
U.S. sports-gambling landscape has changed; PASPA, UIGEA, and other
gambling-related legislation have been ineffective.
States need to be able to seek out every feasible avenue possible to
alleviate the current state of their fiscal budgets. The primary benefit of
allowing sports betting is that states can increase revenue. Other forms
of gambling (e.g., lotteries and general casino games) provide states with
generally steady sources of revenue. 155 There are a variety of ways that
sports betting can add to state revenue:
(1) Repealing or modifying PASPA to allow states to self-regulate
sports gambling would recapture money from foreign sports-
gambling outfits. Keeping money local could help communities
prosper.156 ,
how wagers are placed and funds transferred to ensure that online gambling
does not violate the Wire Act prohibition on wire transfers of funds.
Id.
152. 15 U.S.C. § 3001-3007 (2006).
153. Id. § 3001(a)(1).
154. See S. REP. No. 102-248, at 7 (1991) (noting that "[t]he answer to State
budgetary problems should not be to increase the number of lottery players or sports
bettors, regardless of the worthiness of the cause").
155. See Lucy Dadayan et al., From a Bonanza to a Blue Chip? Gambling Revenue to
the States, ROCKEFELLER INST. 2 (June 19, 2008), http://bit.ly/lb45ZMO (noting that state-
sponsored gambling generates a consistent amount of revenue).
156. One potential drawback to any state-sponsored sports-betting scheme is that
gambling tends to prey on lower income residents. See, e.g., STEVEN G. KOVEN &
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(2) If states permit private casinos to operate their own sports-
betting schemes, they should be able to collect more taxes and
fees from their casinos. Allowing sports wagering in U.S.
casinos will help increase the gross revenue of each casino and
thus will result in an increase of money generated through the
casino tax. 157
(3) Legalized sports betting can also encourage gamblers to place
live bets on sports. Instead of sitting at home and making a bet
with an illegal bookie or risking their money with an unknown
foreign website, sports bettors might be more inclined to seek
out a traditional casino that they can trust with their bets. This
could lead to more traffic inside casinos, which will help
casinos derive more money through their restaurants and
boutiques. 158
(4) Increased local traffic within casinos can lead to more
employment to meet this increased demand.1 59
THOMAS S. LYONS, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES FOR STATE AND LOCAL
PRACTICE (2d ed. 2010), excerpt available at http://bit.ly/laNzdsg (calling gambling a
regressive tax that disproportionately hurts the poor). These sports bettors may or may
not have already been betting with foreign websites, but like higher income residents,
legalized sports betting would make it easier for them to place bets regardless of whether
they gambled previously.
157. "According to a tax revenue analysis prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers,
taxation of regulated Internet gambling is expected to generate between $8.7 billion to
$42.8 billion in federal revenues over its first 10 years." States Move, supra note 130.
On the other hand, some have argued that tax revenue from gambling exhibits a
"displacement effect" because people often finance their gambling activities by reducing
their consumption of other goods or services, so any gain in tax revenue from gambling
could be offset by a decrease in tax revenue from other source . See CHARLENE WEAR
SIMMONS, CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU, GAMBLING IN THE GOLDEN STATE: 1998 FORWARD
54-55 (2006) (citing Jim Landers, The Effect of Casino Gambling on Sales Tax Revenues
in States Legalizing Casinos in the 1990s, 38 ST. TAX NOTES, 1073, 1074-75, 1078-81
(2005)), available at http://bit.ly/lbVvV9f. See also Douglas M. Walker, Overview of
the Economic and Social Impacts of Gambling in the United States, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF GAMBLING 2 (Leighton Vaughan Williams & Donald
Siegel eds., 2012), available at http://bit.ly/18447Cx (noting that casinos in some states
can have a negative effect on tax revenues, possibly because they "cannibalize" other
revenue-generating sources). Walker also notes that lotteries, unlike casinos, tend to
have positive effects on tax revenues. See Walker, supra, at 9. This may be a reason for
states to offer sports betting along the lines of lottery schemes instead of in casinos.
158. This increase in casino traffic will most likely come from locals as opposed to
tourists. See generally William R. Eadington, The Spread of Casinos and Their Role in
Tourism Development, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN TOURiSM DEVELOPMENT (Douglas G.
Pearce & Richard W. Butler eds., 1999), available at http://bit.ly/17hFYp7 (discussing
potential difficulties with replicating Las Vegas-style casino tourism).
159. See Walker, supra note 157, at 2.
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(5) This trend is evidenced by Nevada's sports-betting scheme,
which is currently the only one without restrictions. As the
National Gambling Impact Study Commission reported:
Because sports wagering is illegal in most states, it does
not provide many of the positive impacts that other forms
of gambling offer. In particular, illegal sports wagering
does not contribute to local economies and produces few
jobs, which it could do if it were legal. Unlike casinos or
other destination resorts, sports wagering does not create
other economic sectors.
160
In fact, the American Gaming Association found that "[1]egal
sports wagering helps bring more than 30 million visitors to
Nevada each year and provides employment for thousands of
people.
' 161
By modifying PASPA, states like New Jersey will be able to enjoy
the opportunities that have been made available to Nevada through sports
betting. Most significantly, by allowing states to conduct their own
sports-betting schemes, more American dollars will be wagered legally
with our borders.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although legalizing sports betting and developing appropriate
regulations still require much more legislative processes, this Article
shows there exists an alternate path to allowing individual states to
derive benefits from sports betting. Given that the current laws have
proven ineffective, Congress should consider allowing experimentation
in this age where states are seeking to find ways to relieve their current
fiscal woes. Such a system has the greatest potential to lead to a national
solution for the regulation of sports betting suitable for implementation
by every state wishing to carry out a sports-betting scheme. By
modifying PASPA, the arbitrary differences that exist among states in
their ability to offer sports betting within their borders will also be
eliminated.
Without fully comprehending the scope of sports betting, Congress
continues to believe the development of sports betting will be suppressed
by PASPA and UIGEA. What Congress fails to understand is that sports
betting is a global phenomenon. Without a uniform standard for
determining international Internet jurisdiction, Internet sports-betting
companies will continue to bypass laws such as PASPA and UIGEA.
160. See GAMBLING REPORT, supra note 9, at 2-14.
161. Gaming Facts, supra note 35.
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Additionally, these Acts are diverting billions of dollars from state
sponsored sports-betting schemes as they continue to allow illegal sports-
betting enterprises to thrive. PASPA and UIGEA force sports bettors
who place bets from the United States to send most of their money to
illegal and foreign sports-betting schemes. Without modification, 46
states will never be able to offer sports betting. States should be able to
decide for themselves whether they consider sports betting to be
repugnant to their citizens. No domestic law will be able to underscore
the interest in sports betting. Sports betting is inevitable, and no matter
what is said or done by advocates or opponents, many Americans will
continue to practice the activity. As a result, the time has come to
modify PASPA because the benefits states can derive from sanctioned
sports betting far outweigh its theoretical detriments.

